assessed is not subject to taxation. *I. C. R. R. Co.* v. *County of McLean,* 17 Ill. 291. These various states have formulated many special rules on this subject. In the cases generally, however, is found a reluctance to interfere with the collection of a tax.

EQUITY—QUIETING TITLE TO STOLEN PROPERTY.—Diamond rings and other property were stolen from plaintiff's place of business. The thieves were apprehended and held in custody. The rings and money derived from sale of some of the stolen property were found among their effects. This property was in the hands of the police, who are made co-defendants in this equity suit. Pending criminal prosecution of the accused plaintiff files a bill praying for establishment of his title and return of the property. Demurrer by defendants. *Held,* that the prayer be granted. *Homrich* v. *Robinson et al.* (Mass. 1915) 108 N. E. 1082.

Although several applications of principles of equity are found in the report the case is most interesting from the ultimate result produced. Action for conversion or replevin seems the natural remedy for the case presented. But the court allows equitable relief on the ground that adequate relief at law could not be had during the pendency of the criminal prosecution. This avoided the delay in returning the property that would have happened if a suit at law had been brought. *Hodgkins* v. *Bowser,* 195 Mass. 141 and also the statute (Rev. Laws, c. 159, § 3, cl. 1). To grant the relief asked the court had to say that the property was not so completely in the custody of the law as to bar equity. Concurrent jurisdiction of law and equity in cases of recovery of stolen chattels is found in Massachusetts. *Stratton* v. *Hernon,* 154 Mass. 310, 312. While the principle that a bill in equity will lie for discovery and delivery of possession of chattels of special and peculiar value is well settled, it could not be applied in this case. The same result was produced on a different theory. The relief found in this case recommends itself for effectiveness wherever it can be used. But some cases in other states in which this remedy has been refused either for lack of statute or otherwise are: *Jones* v. *MacKenzie,* 122 Fed. 390; *Sawyer* v. *Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co.,* 129 Fed. 100; *Thompson* v. *Vernay,* 106 Ill. App. 182; *Ireland* v. *Loomis,* 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 37.

EVIDENCE—CURATIVE ADMISSIBILITY.—The plaintiff brought action for damages alleged to have accrued to her on account of an assault by the defendant. Upon cross-examination of the defendant, he was interrogated by plaintiff's counsel as to his alleged misconduct toward another girl in the neighborhood. Subsequently, defendant called two witnesses who were permitted to testify, over plaintiff's objection, that defendant's character was good in every respect. *Held,* (ALLEN, J., dissenting), not to be error. *Gourley* v. *Callahan* (Mo. App. 1915) 176 S. W. 239.

It is clear that, in civil cases, the character of neither party may be inquired into. *Gutzwiller* v. *Lackman,* 23 Mo. 168; *Gough* v. *St. John,* 16 Wend. 645; *Wright* v. *McKee,* 37 Vt. 161; CHAMBERLAYNE, § 3273; WIGMORE, § 64. There is a well recognized exception to this rule when character is put in issue by the nature of the proceedings, *i. e.,* in slander, libel, malicious prose-